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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RULON F. DEYOUNG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970601-CA 
Priority No. 2 
As set forth in the opening Brief,1 the issues presented in 
this matter involve a defendant's right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment. The record reflects that while Appellant Rulon 
DeYoung ("DeYoung") repeatedly invoked his right to the direct 
assistance of counsel, his requests went unheeded. 
The state argues, among other things, that vague references 
to standby assistance served to constitute a proper waiver of 
DeYoung's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The state's arguments 
disregard State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998), which is 
controlling. Heaton requires reversal of this case and remand for 
a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT DEYOUNG DID NOT INVOKE THE RIGHT 
TO SELF-REPRESENTATION. ALSO, THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
TAKE A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER COMPELS REVERSAL, 
A. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT APPOINTED ROBIN 
LJUNGBERG TO PROVIDE DEYOUNG WITH DIRECT REPRESENTATION IN 
COURT PROCEEDINGS, WHILE THE RECORD SUPPORTS OTHERWISE. 
The state claims that during circuit court proceedings, 
xThe opening Brief of Appellant was filed by Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association ("LDA") as standby counsel for Appellant 
Rulon DeYoung ("DeYoung"). 
Judge Nehring appointed Robin Ljungberg ("Ljungberg") to provide 
DeYoung with direct legal representation. (State's Brief ("S.B.") 
at 3-5, 14-15.) The state also claims that "[n]othing in the 
record" supports LDA's assertion on appeal that Judge Nehring 
appointed Ljungberg to serve in a standby capacity. (S.B. at 15.) 
The state is incorrect. 
The record supports that Judge Nehring appointed Ljungberg 
to serve in such a capacity without first taking a proper waiver 
from DeYoung. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918-19; (Brief of 
Appellant, dated May 26, 1998 ("Brief of Appellant"), at 5-11). 
During circuit court proceedings, the judge stated, "[W]hat I 
think I'm going to do is to...authorize ...the appointment of Mr. 
[Ljjungberg to continue in court with Mr. DeYoung to serve as 
standby counsel." (R. 450-51 (emphasis added).) The s t a t e 
disregards the emphasized language. (S.B. at 14-15.)2 
Likewise, the state fails to acknowledge that the only other 
reference in the proceedings to "standby counsel" is with regard 
to Ljungberg serving in that capacity (R. 449) ; and that the 
circuit court docket of the matter shows that Ljungberg was 
2
 It seems that under the state's interpretation of the 
ruling, the only explanation for the "standby" reference is that 
Judge Nehring in effect authorized DeYoung to serve in a standby 
capacity. (R. 450-51.) Such an interpretation is unreasonable. 
It would be unnecessary for the judge to authorize a lay 
person to participate in his own case, and it would be 
inappropriate for a judge to authorize a lay person to serve as 
counsel (standby or otherwise) in a legal proceeding. 
Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the ruling is 
advanced by LDA: Judge Nehring authorized "Mr. [Ljjungberg to 
continue in court ... to serve as standby counsel." (R. 450-51.) 
2 
ordered "to continue as appt and standby counsel." (R. 245.) The 
record supports that the circuit court appointed Ljungberg to 
serve in a standby capacity. 
Thus, the state is incorrect with regard to the status of 
Ljungberg1s appointment in circuit court. Notwithstanding its 
incorrect assertions about the posture of Ljungberg1s standby 
appointment, the state's position emphasizes an important point: 
During the circuit court proceedings, DeYoung did not invoke the 
right to self-representation and he did not waive his right to 
counsel. That is relevant to the appeal. 
Indeed, whether the record plainly supports the standby 
appointment or otherwise in circuit court may be inconsequential 
to the outcome of this appeal. LDA has raised the matter to show 
that enough was said in circuit court proceedings to lead 
Ljungberg and DeYoung to believe that DeYoung was ordered to 
proceed pro se with standby assistance. The matter was 
transferred to the district court in that posture. When DeYoung 
and Ljungberg represented to the district court that the circuit 
court ordered Ljungberg to serve in a standby capacity, the 
prosecutor did not correct that representation likely because he 
also understood that to be the case. (See R. 1083:3-6.) 
Also, when DeYoung's case was transferred to district court, 
DeYoung never represented to Judge Stirba that he invoked the 
right to self-representation or waived the right to counsel in 
circuit court. (R. 1083:2-15.) Rather, he represented the status 
of the matter as he understood it: Ljungberg was appointed to 
3 
serve in a standby capacity. (Id.) Given Judge Stirbafs limited 
information concerning the posture of the case, she should have 
asked DeYoung "whether he wished to waive his right to counsel." 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914. The judge failed to make that inquiry.3 
B. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY A STATEMENT BY DEYOUNG 
CONSTITUTING A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OR INVOCATION 
OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
As set forth in the opening brief on appeal, when DeYoung 
arrived in the district court, he did not "assert his right to 
self-representation, and the judge did not ask [defendant] 
whether he wished to waive his right to counsel." State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914. Indeed, the state admits that DeYoung 
specifically did not invoke the right to self-representation. 
(S.B. at 24 ("defendant is correct that he also did not invoke 
his right of self-representation in the strictest sense").) 
Notwithstanding, the state seems to argue that because 
DeYoung expressed concerns with respect to Ljungberg's services, 
and because DeYoung represented that Ljungberg "could not 
ethically present the defenses that defendant wanted to present" 
(S.B. at 19), that was sufficient to invoke the right to self-
3
 Even if DeYoung had waived the right to counsel in the 
circuit court, that would have been irrelevant in the trial 
court. A circuit court magistrate "does not sit as a judge of a 
court and exercises none of the powers of a judge." State v. 
Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1998) (citing 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991)). Also, the Utah 
Supreme Court has placed "the important responsibility" of 
determining waiver on the " t r i a l court." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
Thus, the trial court judge must be responsible for asking 
"whether [defendant] wished to waive his right to counsel." Id. 
at 914. 
4 
representation or to waive the right to counsel. The state also 
suggests that the mere use of the term "self-representation" by 
DeYoung and/or Ljungberg was sufficient to allow the trial court 
to deny DeYoung his right to the direct assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment. (S.B. at 22 ("it was defendant and his 
counsel Mr. Ljungberg who first raised the issue of self-
representation").) 
The state's arguments are legally incorrect. (See S.B. at 
22-25 (state fails to cite to controlling authority in support of 
its proposition).) U.S. v. Kienenberqer, 13 F.3d 1354 (9th Cir. 
1994), (relying on the Sixth Amendment, court found that 
defendant did not relinquish the right to be represented by 
counsel where his requests to proceed pro se "were not 
unequivocal"). Complaints about counsel do not constitute a 
waiver of the right to counsel, and they do not constitute an 
invocation of the right to self-representation. See Heaton, 958 
P.2d at 914-15. Likewise, the mere use of the term "self-
representation" or "standby" counsel is not sufficient to allow 
the trial court to deny a defendant his right to the direct 
assistance of counsel in a matter.4 Id. 
4The state claims that LDA's reliance on U.S. v. 
Kienenberqer, 13 F.3d 1354 (9th Cir. 1994), is misplaced. LDA 
relied on that case for the proposition that a defendant's 
request for standby assistance does not constitute an invocation 
of the right to self-representation. 
In apparently "distinguishing" Kienenberqer from this 
matter, the state admits that the facts in that case reflect that 
defendant "repeatedly told the trial court he wanted to represent 
himself, but that he wanted the 'assistance' of counsel to help 
him with procedural matters." (S.B. at 23.) The state does not 
(continued...) 
5 
In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that during 
hearings before the trial court the defendant complained about 
his court-appointed attorney. 
[Defendant] indicated that he did not feel he was receiving 
adequate legal representation and that he felt forced to 
proceed on his own. His attorney indicated that a "rift" had 
developed between them, that he was uncomfortable going to 
trial because of the "total conflict" between them, and that 
he thought [defendant] wanted to represent himself. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 913-14. The Utah Supreme Court considered 
defendant's remarks and found that defendant "did not assert his 
right to self-representation, and the judge did not ask 
[defendant] whether he wished to waive his right to counsel." Id. 
Where the trial court is considering complaints about 
counsel and defendant's references to self-representation, the 
Heaton court reminded trial judges that they must resolve 
concerns in favor of defendant's right to counsel. There is a 
"presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be 
resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 
4(...continued) 
dispute the holding that although defendant made requests for 
self-representation to the trial court, his requests were not 
unequivocal. Defendant did not invoke the right to self-
representation since he simultaneously requested legal assistance 
in the form of standby counsel. The state has acknowledged that 
Kienenberger's statements for self-representation and standby 
assistance failed to constitute an invocation of the right to 
self-represent. (S.B. at 23.) 
The Kienenberger result is consistent with Heaton, where all 
doubts are resolved in favor of defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. In Kienenberger, the trial court and appellate court 
recognized Kienenberger was requesting some form of legal 
assistance. The courts resolved Kienenberger's requests for legal 
assistance in favor of his right to counsel. See Heaton, 958 P.2d 
at 918. 
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(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); U.S. v. 
Williamson, 806 F. 2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
The state also argues that because DeYoung discussed his 
understanding of the standby arrangement with Judge Stirba, 
DeYoung "in effect waived his Sixth Amendment right to the full 
representation by counsel" when "Judge Stirba granted his 
request."5 (S.B. at 24.) That argument also must be rejected 
under Heaton for the reasons stated above. References to standby 
counsel do not constitute waiver. 
Also, in the context of this case, DeYoung made references 
to the standby arrangement to explain his understanding of what 
transpired in the circuit court. The references and discussions 
concerning the arrangement were not presented to Judge Stirba in 
the form of a "request" to waive counsel or to proceed pro se. 
Specifically, the state relies on the following comments made by 
Ljungberg and DeYoung during Judge Stirba's inquiry into the 
matter. 
First, the state relies on Ljungberg1s statements to the 
trial court indicating DeYoung's "desire to represent himself." 
(S.B. at 19.) Those statements do not constitute evidence of 
DeYoung's position. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990) (citing Leon Shaffer Golnick Adv., Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d 
1015, 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (attorney's unsworn 
5
 The "request" identified by the state consists of De-
Young's request for legal assistance. The court did not provide 
DeYoung with direct assistance, as it should, but ordered 
Ljungberg to serve as standby counsel in the case. 
7 
statements are not evidence)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914 
(counsel told trial court that he thought defendant wanted to 
represent himself; defendant did not assert right to self-
representation and he did not waive counsel); State v. Galli, 345 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11 (Utah 1998) (statements of defense counsel 
are insufficient to constitute admission on the part of 
defendant). In addition, on issues of constitutional importance, 
counsel's remarks cannot be sufficient to constitute defendant's 
acquiescence in the matter. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1313 (Utah 1987) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650 
(1976) (J., White concurring) (lawyer cannot make admission for 
defendant)). Thus, Ljungberg's comments are irrelevant. 
Next, the state considers DeYoung's remarks to Judge Stirba. 
DeYoung's comments, as reflected in the State's Brief, are 
emphasized in each point identified by LDA below: 
• Judge Stirba asked DeYoung if Ljungberg was his counsel 
or if he wished Ljungberg "to be standby counsel." DeYoung's 
answer was not responsive. Rather, he proceeded to explain 
to Judge Stirba his understanding as to how the matter was 
resolved in the circuit court: 
Your Honor, on our January roll call before Judge 
Nehrinq, it was determined in that hearing that, in 
meeting with Mr. Ljungberg that morning, Mr. Ljungberg 
was not a -- familiar with tax law. And seeing that the 
charges by the State in this matter is pertaining to 
tax law, there are several issues that I have as a 
defense that I would like to present to the Court. 
(S.B. at 19-20 (quoting R. 1083:4).) That statement cannot 
be construed as sufficient to constitute a waiver of the 
right to counsel or an invocation of the right to self-
representation. 
• Next, DeYoung stated that "Judge Nehring did rule to 
the effect that I would be able to represent myself as a 
citizen in party and have Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel." 
8 
(S.B. at 20.) That statement likewise is not enough. DeYoung 
was merely explaining to Judge Stirba what had happened in 
the circuit court proceedings as he understood it. 
• DeYoung next expressed that he understood his right to 
counsel (S.B. at 20), and he stated "I have asked the 
previous court for counsel that could represent me in 
regards to tax matters." (Id.; R. 1083:5.) DeYoung also 
disclosed that he could not afford an attorney. Those 
statements support DeYoung's request for counsel. 
• When the court followed up by asking DeYoung if he 
needed counsel appointed to represent him, DeYoung stated 
the following: 
To my understanding, Mr. -- and with the understanding 
that I have with Mr. Liungberg, he is willing to assist 
me in regards to the presence of the Court, Mr. 
Liungberg expressed that morning in that meeting that 
there are certain issues that he would have problems in 
presenting before the Court...And, therefore, he is -
he admitted or agreed that he would assist. 
(S.B. at 20 (cites R. 1083:6).) Again, DeYoung related what 
had transpired in earlier proceedings, and he explained 
Ljungberg's discomfort. Those statements do not constitute 
waiver of the right to counsel and they do not support 
invocation of the right to self-representation. 
• DeYoung's next statement to the court reflected his 
desire to have counsel appointed to represent him: "I would 
hope to be able to have representation to the quality that I 
would be able to bring forth the issues on the tax matters 
that I'm entitled to." (S.B. at 21; R. 1083:7.) DeYoung 
also answered in the affirmative when Judge Stirba asked if 
he would like counsel with an expertise in tax and criminal 
law. (S.B. at 21; R. 1083:7-8.) 
• Thereafter, the judge explored DeYoung's educational 
background and asked if DeYoung thought that representing 
himself "is a better way for you to proceed, in light of 
your concerns and your issues." (S.B. at 22; R. 1083:11.) 
DeYoung again expressed that Ljungberg was uncomfortable 
with issues that DeYoung felt needed to be raised. (S.B. at 
22; R. 1083:12.) 
Overall, the colloquy reflected that DeYoung felt strongly 
about his case, he believed Ljungberg was uncomfortable with 
9 
certain issues, DeYoung appreciated and desired legal assistance, 
and DeYoung hoped to have representation of counsel who would be 
able to "bring forth the issues on the tax matters that [he was] 
entitled to." (R. 1083:5-14.) DeYoung was told he was not 
entitled to a tax expert, then the court proceeded as though the 
only option available was self-representation. The circumstances 
set forth in the record do not constitute "waiver" of the right 
to counsel or "invocation" of the right to self-represent. 
In this matter, the trial court failed in its duty to 
"jealously protect []" the defendant's constitutional right to 
counsel. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. As set forth in Heaton, 
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal 
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be 
jealously protected by the trial court. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by 
counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, 
in which the accused -- whose life or liberty is at stake --
is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the 
serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of 
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent 
waiver by the accused. 
Id. (emphasis in original; cites Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465). 
The record shows that in this case, Judge Stirba was so 
entrenched in her beliefs that DeYoung desired to proceed pro se 
that she was unwilling to take any additional information about 
the matter into consideration, including DeYoung's clear 
statements that "I have asked the previous court for counsel that 
could represent me in regards to tax matters;" "I would hope to 
be able to have representation to the quality that I would be 
10 
able to bring forth the issues on the tax matters that I'm 
entitled to;" and that DeYoung would like an attorney appointed 
to the matter who had expertise in tax law and some criminal 
expertise as well. (R. 1083:7-8.) The trial court violated its 
duty to safeguard DeYoung's constitutional rights. 
C. IN DISCUSSING THE COLLOQUY IN THIS CASE, THE STATE 
APPLIES A SELF-SERVING, NARROW INTERPRETATION TO HEATON THAT 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THAT CASE. 
As set forth in the opening Brief, since DeYoung did not 
invoke the right to self-representation and he did not waive the 
right to counsel, there was no basis for a colloquy. (See Brief 
of Appellant, at 13.) Nevertheless, the trial court engaged in a 
limited inquiry. The state acknowledges that the colloquy was 
deficient (S.B. at 26-28, 34), but claims the deficiencies are of 
no consequence. The state conveniently disregards language in 
Heaton relevant to the colloquy, and/or interprets that case in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the facts set forth in the 
opinion. 
Specifically, in Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that a colloquy on the record between the court and defendant is 
the preferred method of determining whether defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived the right to counsel. State v. Frampton, 
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 n. 12 (Utah 1987). The Frampton court 
identified a 16-point colloquy for use by trial courts. Id. 
In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the trial 
court must advise defendant through use of the colloquy of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the 
11 
record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.1" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (quoting 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). The Heaton 
court addressed three areas of importance to the colloquy: 
The trial court should (1) advise the defendant of his 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well 
as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2) 
ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of 
the decision to represent himself, including the expectation 
that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter 
of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant 
comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the 
range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts 
essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; see also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 
732-33 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991); 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n. 12; State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 
629, 636 (Utah App.), rev!d on other grounds per curiam, 862 P.2d 
1354 (Utah 1993); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; U.S. v. Padilla, 819 
F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987). 
The court in Heaton clarified that if the trial court failed 
to engage in "such a colloquy," the reviewing court "will look at 
the record and make a de novo determination regarding the 
validity of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary 
circumstances, the existence of which we will address on a case-
by-case basis." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
In this matter, the state acknowledges that the trial court 
at least failed to explain "the nature of the charges, the 
possible penalties defendant faced if convicted, and a warning 
that the trial court would not advise defendant on how to 
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proceed." (S.B. at 28.) That is, the trial court failed to 
perform the inquiry as directed in Heaton and Frampton, to "(3) 
ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the 
charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, 
and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of 
the case." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
The state does not deny the importance of that particular 
aspect of the colloquy, likely because case law emphasizes it. 
In Frampton, the court considered defendant's background 
information to be relevant but not dispositive as to whether 
defendant understood the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
self-representation. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. Rather, the 
record must show that "defendant understood the seriousness of 
the charges and knew the possible maximum penalty." Id.; Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 918. 
Since the trial court's colloquy here failed to explore 
those importance issues, the analysis ends and the case must be 
reversed. The state disagrees and asserts that this Court may 
review the record in its entirety to make up for the deficient 
colloquy. As set forth below, the state's argument is incorrect. 
1. The State Improperly Urges This Court to Review the 
Entire Record to Find a Valid Waiver. 
According to the state, the deficient colloquy is of no 
consequence because this Court may review the record in its 
entirety to determine whether DeYoung understood the nature of 
the charges, the proceedings, the range of permissible punish-
ments, and any additional facts essential to a broad under-
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standing of the case. Yet, Heaton rejects such a review of the 
record. According to the court in Heaton, in the absence of "such 
a colloquy" as set forth in Heaton and Frampton, a reviewing 
court will look to the record for waiver "only in extraordinary 
circumstances." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
The state disregards the plain language of Heaton and claims 
a reviewing court is allowed to consider the entire record for 
waiver except "when no colloquy or warnings are given by the 
trial court." (S.B. at 34 (emphasis in original).) The state's 
interpretation is inconsistent with the facts set forth in 
Heaton. 
In that case, after defendant complained about his 
attorney's representation, the trial court engaged in a limited 
colloquy by advising the defendant with respect to his right to 
self-representation, and recommending to defendant that he rely 
on counsel John Caine's expertise in the matter. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
at 918-19. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Caine to serve 
in Heaton's case in a standby capacity. Id. at 913-14 and 918-19. 
The trial court's advice consisted of a partial colloquy as 
set forth in Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (during the colloquy, the 
court should advise defendant of his constitutional right to 
represent himself) and Frampton, 737 P.2d 187-88 n.12. 
The Utah Supreme Court assessed the limited colloquy and 
stated that while the advice was "certainly appropriate", "it 
addressed only one of the disadvantages of self-representation." 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. Thus, the incomplete colloquy was 
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deficient. Further, the limited colloquy did not open the door to 
an examination of the entire record to determine waiver. That 
door opened only in extraordinary circumstances. "There are no 
extraordinary circumstances in this case which would justify our 
examination of the record and making a de novo determination as 
to whether Heaton knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. Heaton supports that where the 
trial court fails to engage in "such a colloquy" as directed --
that is, a colloquy that includes advising defendant of the 
nature of the charges and the range of permissible punishments --
the reviewing court will not look to the record to make up for 
the deficiencies, absent extraordinary circumstances. 
For all practical purposes DeYoung's case is 
indistinguishable from Heaton's case. Here, as in Heaton, the 
trial court engaged in a deficient and limited colloquy, (see 
S.B. at 26-28, 34), ordered defendant to proceed pro se and 
appointed an attorney to assist in a standby capacity. As in 
Heaton, "[T]here are no extraordinary circumstances in this case" 
which would justify this Court's review of the record to 
determine whether defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived 
his right to counsel." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. 
2. The State Relies on the Pleadings and Conversations That 
Supposedly Took Place off the Record to Assert that a Review 
of the Record Supports a Knowing and Voluntary Waiver. 
According to the state, the record supports that DeYoung 
understood the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range 
of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to 
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a broad understanding of the case because he sat through the 
preliminary hearing, the circuit court read the charging document 
to DeYoung placing him "on clear notice that he could incur 
serious penalties in the event he was convicted," and Ljungberg 
informed the court that he met with DeYoung to discuss the case. 
(S.B. at 34-35.) According to the state, "Between the colloquy 
and the record, therefore, there can be no doubt that defendant 
was well aware of the consequences of his choice to proceed pro 
se and any dangers or disadvantages in his doing so." (S.B. at 
34-35.) 
The state essentially is asking this Court to find that 
indefinite references in the record support the specific 
determination that DeYoung knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel. Heaton does not support such a result. Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 918-19; see also Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 
999 (11th Cir. 1989) (record failed to reflect content of 
conferences relevant to defendant's waiver of counsel; thus, the 
record was ambiguous, contradictory and in some instance "the 
facts [were] just not there"; case reversed for a clear record 
regarding the matter). 
With respect to the state's claim that the charging document 
and DeYoung's attendance at the preliminary hearing placed him on 
notice of the nature of the charges, the state ignores important 
facts in the record. The state disregards that in connection with 
the counts set forth in the Information, DeYoung was never 
arraigned and was never asked whether he comprehended the nature 
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of the charges. (See Brief or Appellant at 16, n.4.) 
In addition, throughout the proceedings in the circuit and 
district courts, DeYoung made repeated requests for a bill of 
particulars concerning the charges, clarification on the charges 
and/or the entry of an order dismissing the matter or quashing 
the bindover for failing to "state a proper cause of action." 
(See R. 34-161; 162-76; 216-19; 235-38; 250-75; 292-94; 312-15.) 
The filings defy the notion that DeYoung comprehended the nature 
of the offenses. Further, since the trial court ordered the state 
to amend six of the counts on the second day of trial (R. 
1044:278-79), there was no opportunity for DeYoung to understand 
the nature of the charges at the time of the colloquy. See 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919 (trial court must determine complete 
waiver at the time that defendant proceeds pro se, not after). 
With respect to the penalties, the state does not deny that 
DeYoung was never informed of the range of permissible 
punishments he faced if convicted of each offense. See Frampton, 
737 P.2d 187-88 n.12; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. Rather, the state 
argues that DeYoung should have been on notice of the penalties 
based on the manner in which each count was charged in the 
Information. (S.B. at 34; see R. 9-13.) 
The state's argument makes language in Heaton and Frampton 
superfluous. If the Information satisfied the trial court's duty 
to advise the defendant of the nature of the charges and range of 
permissible punishments, portions of the colloquy would be 
unnecessary. See Frampton, 737 P.2d 187-88 and n.12; Heaton, 958 
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P.2d at 918. In addition, in DeYoungfs case, the Information 
simply identified the level or degree of each offense as second 
or third degree felony offenses. The Information did not 
identify the penalty associated with such offenses. (R. 9-13.) 
Thus, there was no reason to believe that DeYoung understood the 
range of permissible punishments here based on the Information. 
With respect to the punishment, Judge Stirba represented 
that she would recommend probation for DeYoung; she did not 
indicate that the filing of a "frivolous" motion may cause her to 
revoke that recommendation. That additional fact was important to 
DeYoung's understanding of the range of permissible punishments 
in this case. Since DeYoung was not advised of facts essential 
to his understanding of the matter, he was not aware that his 
filings would cause the judge to abandon the probation 
recommendation. (See Brief of Appellant at 16-17.) 
The state considered Ljungberg1s representations to the 
court -- that he had discussed trial strategy and constitutional 
matters with DeYoung -- as a compelling basis for finding that 
DeYoung understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. (S.B. at 35.) Ljungberg's representations should 
not be allowed to take the place of record support for the 
matter. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13;6 Strozier, 871 F.2d at 
6A comparison may be drawn here to the entry of a plea under 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In taking a Rule 11 
plea, a trial court is obligated to inquire whether defendant has 
knowingly and intelligently waived specific constitutional 
rights, including "[t]hat if defendant is not represented by 
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
(continued...) 
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999 (not only did record fail to reflect the content of the 
conference, but there was no way of knowing from the record what 
advice standby counsel gave to defendant). Indeed, because the 
record is silent with respect to the content of those 
discussions, they do not assist in the analysis of determining 
whether DeYoung comprehended the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation. See Strozier, 871 F.2d at 998 (in 
determining a knowing and intelligent waiver, the question is 
what did the defendant understand). Ljungberg's representations 
to the court without more cannot be sufficient to find that 
DeYoung knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
Finally, the state asserts that "several other courts [] have 
recognized that the presence of standby counsel" is a 
"significant safeguard that offsets some of [a] colloquy's 
deficiencies." (S.B. at 30.) In support of that assertion the 
state relies mostly on early cases from other state courts. (Id.) 
6(...continued) 
desire counsel." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. The trial court also 
must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the 
charges against him. Id. at 1312-13. 
As in Heaton, Rule 11 squarely places on the trial court the 
burden of ensuring an intelligent, knowing waiver and plea. To 
that end, the court in Gibbons stated " [T]he law places the 
burden of establishing compliance with those requirements on the 
trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense 
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand" the 
matter. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. 
The same burden applies to trial judges in taking a wavier 
of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Heaton, 958 
P. 2d at 918-19. It should not be sufficient under Heaton to 
assume that standby counsel has made the necessary inquiry to 
determine whether defendant fully understands the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, especially where that duty 
belongs to the trial court. 
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Those cases are not controlling here. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Heaton refused to recognize that 
standby assistance made up for an incomplete inquiry. In that 
case, although the trial judge appointed an attorney to serve in 
a standby capacity, Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914, the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled there were no extraordinary circumstances that would 
allow that court to look beyond the colloquy to find waiver. Id. 
at 919. Thus, according to Heaton, the appointment of standby 
counsel will not make up for deficiencies in the colloquy. Heaton 
controls here. This Court is precluded from looking beyond the 
deficient colloquy to find support in the record for waiver. 
D. THE STATE CONSIDERS STANDBY ASSISTANCE TO BE AS 
BENEFICIAL AS DIRECT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. NEITHER THE LAW 
NOR THE FACTS OF THIS CASE SUPPORT THAT POSITION. 
According to the state, "the defendant who receives the 
active assistance of standby counsel does not truly give up all 
the advantages and benefits of the representation of counsel." 
(S.B. at 31.) The state disregards language relevant to that 
issue as set forth in U.S. v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 
1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991): 
Given the limited role that a standby attorney plays, we 
think it clear that the assistance of standby counsel, no 
matter how useful to the court or the defendant, cannot 
qualify as the assistance of counsel required by the Sixth 
Amendment. There can be no question that the roles of 
standby counsel and full-fledged defense counsel are 
fundamentally different. The very definition of full-
fledged counsel includes the proposition that the counselor, 
and not the accused, bears the responsibility for the 
defense; by contrast, the key limitation on standby counsel 
is that such counsel not be responsible -- and not be 
perceived to be responsible -- for the accused's defense. 
Id. at 312; Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1231 (5th Cir. 
20 
1997) ("We emphasized in Taylor that '[s]tandby counsel does not 
represent the defendant1.... Rather, his role is one of an 'ob-
server, an attorney who attends the proceeding and who may offer 
advice, but who does not speak for the defendant or bear respon-
sibility for his defense'"); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 
U.S. 168, 177-78 (1984) (the proper role of standby is quite 
limited); Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. 
In its brief, the state suggests Ljungberg's standby 
assistance allowed DeYoung to realize the benefits and advantages 
of direct assistance. To make its point, the state refers to 
portions of the record reflecting ways in which Ljungberg 
assisted DeYoung. (S.B. at 10-11, 32.) As the state points out, 
Ljungberg filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on Defendant's 
Diminished Capacity, which was later withdrawn, and a request for 
extension of time; during hearings Ljungberg summed up DeYoung's 
arguments; and during trial Ljungberg invoked the witness 
exclusionary rule, assisted DeYoung in making objections, made a 
motion to dismiss at the end of the state's case-in-chief, and 
argued for the inclusion of portions of DeYoung1s proposed jury 
instructions. (See S.B. at 10-11, 32.) 
The state has identified 1 page in 1070 from the pleadings 
file that was submitted by Ljungberg (the Notice which was later 
withdrawn); summations by Ljungberg that did not necessarily 
involve arguing additional substance; and contributions from 
Ljungberg during trial that did not involve anything more than 
observing a case for which Ljungberg had no direct responsibility 
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for investigation, preparation, or trial. Ljungberg provided 
adequate standby assistance. That is not in issue. Ljungberg was 
not required to assist with substantive matters, and therefore, 
did not provide the constitutionally guaranteed assistance of 
counsel. 
Overall, the state cites to approximately 90 pages in the 
record where Ljungberg was involved in restating DeYoung's 
positions and arguments, or making routine objections and trial 
requests. The record consists of more than 24 00 pages; 
Ljungberg1s "active and zealous standby assistance" as identified 
by the state (S.B. at 10-22, 30, 32) is reflected in less than 4% 
of the record. 
Meanwhile, DeYoung repeatedly implored the court to address 
his motions, he struggled with witness examinations and his own 
testimony, and he drew so many objections during his opening 
statement that he ultimately waived it. DeYoung also 
inadvertently compromised the judge's probation recommendation 
with his "frivolous" filing. DeYoung did not realize the benefits 
or the advantages of having direct assistance at trial. 
Ljungberg1s limited role was appropriate given his standby 
status. The standby status did not satisfy Sixth Amendment 
standards. Taylor, 933 F.2d 312. 
E. THE STATE CORRECTLY RECOGNIZES THAT JUDGE STIRBA 
ESSENTIALLY TREATED DEYOUNG'S LATER REQUESTS FOR COUNSEL AS 
REQUESTS FOR SUBSTITUTE STANDBY ASSISTANCE. THAT WAS 
IMPROPER. 
The state makes important acknowledgments with respect to 
DeYoung's re-invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
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The state recognizes that after DeYoung filed papers with the 
trial court asserting that he refused to waive any constitutional 
right to counsel (R. 652-53; 671; 686-87), Judge Stirba asked 
DeYoung simply "to address his concerns regarding Mr. Ljungberg 
as standby counsel." (S.B. at 37 (cites R. 1083:96-100).) As the 
state points out, in response, DeYoung argued that he had a 
"contract of those constitutional rights" with the court and that 
he "demanded his Constitutional rights.1" (S.B. at 37.) 
As the state acknowledges, the "judge responded that 
criminal defendants have many constitutional rights, including 
the right to counsel, 'if you choose to have counsel.1" (S.B. at 
37.) DeYoung responded with, "Thank you, Your Honor." (R. 
1083:99.) The judge then changed gears and focused on Ljungberg!s 
standby assistance. (R. 1083:100.) 
As the state points out, the judge "essentially treated" 
DeYoung's assertions for counsel as a request for substitute 
standby counsel. (S.B. at 37-38.) Without further inquiry into 
DeYoung's assertions that he refused to waive any constitutional 
right to counsel, the judge asked DeYoung to identify his 
concerns with Ljungberg's assistance. (S.B. at 38.) Thereafter, 
the judge "found that Ljungberg was providing reasonable 
representation as standby counsel." (S.B. at 38; R. 1083:116.) 
According to the state, notwithstanding DeYoung's clear 
assertions that he refused to waive any constitutional rights to 
counsel, DeYoung did not "invoke his right to counsel" because he 
failed to further insist that the trial court consider his plain 
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requests. (S.B. at 38.) The state is incorrect. DeYoung invoked 
the right to counsel. The trial court's failure to properly 
regard DeYoung's plain requests constituted legal error. DeYoung 
was not required to do any more with regard to the matter. 
Here, the trial court's treatment of DeYoung's request for 
his constitutional right to counsel raises serious 
considerations. Plainly, DeYoung requested counsel pursuant to 
his constitutional rights. Because the trial judge refused even 
to consider that DeYoung was reasserting his right to counsel, 
the judge again violated the trial court's duty to "jealously 
protect []" a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to direct 
assistance. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. 
In addition, the state suggests that DeYoung's request for 
counsel really amounted to a request to have "someone whom he 
viewed to be a tax expert [to] assist him at trial." (S.B. at 
3 9.) The clear language of DeYoung!s requests fails to support 
such an interpretation. To the extent the request was ambiguous, 
the judge was required at least to inquire into the matter and to 
resolve all doubts in favor of DeYoung's right under the Sixth 
Amendment to the direct assistance of counsel. See Heaton, 958 
P.2d at 917 ("doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the 
defendant's favor"). The trial court's failure to properly attend 
to this matter interfered with DeYoung's fundamental 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the opening Brief and herein, this case 
should be reversed and remanded on the basis that the trial court 
violated DeYoung's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel. 
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